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283 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2002)
L Faas
OnJune 3,1993, Herman Smith, Sr. ("Smith") was watching television in his
recliner when Edward Ernest Hartman (Hartman") shot him at close range in
the back of the head. Hartman lived with the elderly Smith in Northampton
County, North Carolina. After the murder, Hartman left Smith in the recliner for
several days as he tried to cash forged checks and to sell some of Smith's valu-
ables. Hartman was arrested and eventually confessed to murdering Smith.'
The State charged Hartman in a short-form indictment that identified the
crime as "murder." Prior to trial, the State informed Hartman at a motions
hearing that it intended to prosecute him for first degree murder, and, if con-
victed, it would seek the death penalty by alleging that he committed the murder
during a robbery. Hartman moved to dismiss the indictment because it did not
allege all the elements of first-degree murder. I-Es motion was denied; he was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.2
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected Hartman's
constitutional challenge to the short-form indictment. Hartman filed for federal
habeas relief on the same grounds- that the indictment was insufficient because
it did not allege all of the essential elements of first-degree murder. This argu-
ment was rejected bythe district court and Hartman appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth (Ituit?
II Hddng
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision to reject Hartman's challenge to the
short-form indictment neither contradicted nor unreasonably applied United
States Supreme Court precedent.4 It held that the North Carolina short-form
indictment, which alleges onlythe common law elements of murder, is constitu-
tionally sufficient.5
1. State v. Hartman, 476 S.E2d 328,331-32 (N.C 1996).
2. Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190, 193 (4th Or. 2002).
3. Id
4. Id at 199; se28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (codified as amended byAnti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to a stare court
decision can only be granted if the state court decision was "contrary to" or "an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law").
5. Hamnm, 283 F.3d at 199; s aso N.C GEN. STAT S 15-144 (1999) (stating that "it is
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MI. A ni~sis
Hartman made two arguments against the North Carolina short-form
indictment. First, he argued that the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause require that the State's charging document list all the essential elements of
the charged offense.6 The court relied on Datis v Temity rf Utah and Bergwww
v Badee to uphold the constitutionality of short-form murder indictments.9
DaTis and BeV m essentially stated that a short-form murder indictment that
only alleges the common law elements of murder is constitutionally sufficient."
The indictment need not list the distinguishing elements between first-degree and
second-degree murder because those elements are circumstances of aggravation."
Therefore, the distinguishing elements are a distinction between degrees of
punishment, not a distinction between offenses. 2
Hartman's second argument was that first and second-degree murder are
separate offenses requiring different essential elements. 3 The Fourth Crcuit
found that the Supreme Court of North Carolina clearly stated in State v Dais'"
that murder had one definition- the intentional and unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought- and was divided into two degrees in order for
murder in the first degree to carry a greater punishment." Based on Dais, the
sufficient in describing murder to allege that the accused person feloniously, willfully, and of his
malice aforethought, kill and murder" the victim).
6. Hmmm, 283 F.3d at 194.
7. 151 US. 262 (1894).
8. 157 Us. 655 (1895).
9. Hannwr 283 F.3d at 196-97; see Davis v. Territory of Utah, 151 US. 262, 266 (1894)
(holding that the short-form indictment did not need to include the elements that distinguished
first-degree murder from second-degree murder because theywere statutorily the same crime that
had been divided into two classes so that the punishment may be adjusted "with reference to the
presence or absence of circumstances of aggravation"); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 US. 655, 658
(1895) (holding that elements which distinguished murder in the first degree and murder in the
second degree "created no new crimes, but merely made a distinction with a view to a difference
in the punishment between the most heinous and the less aggravated grades of the crime of
murder"). The Fourth Crcuit did not applythe holdings of Appaii v NewjeeyorJaos v Unitd
Sms because it ruled in Urind Sawt a rim that they were new rules that could not be applied
retroactivelyon collateral review. SEHawnm, 283 F3d at 192 n.2 (citing United States v. Sanders,
247 F.3d 139,151 (4th Or. 2001)). Seegnaul/yApprendi v. NewJersey, 530 US. 466 (2000);Jones
v. United States, 526 US. 227 (1999).
10. TDazi, 151 U.S. at 266-67; Begwm, 157 US. at 658.
11. Begw, 157 US. at 658.
12. Id
13. Hanm, 283 F3d at 194.
14. 290 S.E2d 574 (N.C 1982).
15. Hamn, 283 F.3d at 198;seeState v. Davis, 290 S.E2d 574,588 (NC 1982) (concluding
"that the law of this jurisdiction recognizes no offense of felony murder in the second degree").
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Fourth Curcut held that there is only one common law crime of murder in North
Carolina, first-degree and second-degree murder are not separate offenses.16
IV. Apphiain mVhg a
Because murder indictments in Virginia need not allege the elements of first-
degree or second-degree murder, theyare similar to the indictment at issue in this
case. 7 In Virginia, the short form of the indictment is sufficient to allege first-
degree murder." A Virginia defendant in the same position, making a similar
claim that the indictment was insufficient, could expect the same outcome in the
Fourth Crcuit. However, in Virginia, the indictment used in Haymm could not
charge capital murder, because in Virginia capital murder is a separate statutory
offense. 9 Because of this statutory difference, the exact situation that arose in
Ha=mn could not arise in Virginia.
The situation that may arise in Virginia, relevant to Hamnm, is a capital
murder indictment that is insufficient because it does not allege the aggravating
sentencing factors.2 Virginia defense attorneys can argue that the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Ri4 v A izor% requires that the rulings in Apprwri
v NewJerse/ and Jow v Unitd State 3 apply to all capital murder indictments.24
16. Hanmw, 283 F3d at 198-99.
17. S&Ward v. Commonwealth, 138 S.E2d 293,296 (Va. 1964) (explaining that "[it is not
necessarythat the indictment should charge murder in the first degree or use that description which,
according to the statute, constitutes that degree of offense").
18. S Hobson v. Youell, 15 S.E.2d 76, 78 (Va. 1941) (stating that "the sufficiency of the
short form of the indictment to support a conviction of murder in the first degree has been
repeatedly questioned and just as repeatedly and emphatically answered in the affirmative by this
court").
19. SeegmalyVA. CODE ANN. S 181-31 (Mlachie Supp. 2002) (defining the offense of capital
murder).
20. Such an indictment raises two questions. It can be attacked as insufficient to charge
capital murder. Alternatively, the defense can move to strike death from the case on the ground
that the indictment charges all of the elements of a capital murder which will support a life sentence,
but that it does not charge a capital offense which will support a sentence of death. See VA. CODE
ANN. S 19.2-217 (Michie 2000) (providing statutoryright to indictment). For a copy of the Motion
to Dismiss Capital Murder Indictments for Failure to Allege Aggravating Elements or a copyof the
Motion to Strike Death from the Capital Murder PenaltyPhase, please contact the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse or visit our website at http'J/vc3.org and dick on "downloads."
21. 122 S. a. 2428 (2002).
22. 530 US. 466 (2000).
23. 526 US. 227 (1999).
24. Seearvmdlysking v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct.2428 (2002) (applyingAlpiand Js to apital
murder cases); Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 US. 466,490 (2000) (explaining that in cases in which
facts will increase the penakyof a crime beyond the statutorymaximum, those facts must be proven
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); Jones v. United States, 526 U. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (finding
that a carjacking statute that listed three acts with three different penalties must be treated as three
distinct offenses and each offense "must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt").
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Rng throughJcr, requires that aggravators be included in federal indictments.25
While there is no constitutional right to a grand juryor an indictment in the states
generally, Virginia does provide a statutoryight to both.26 Through this statutory
right and the Sixth Amendment notice clause, attorneys can argue that the hold-
ings in Jcrs and Appmi require Virginia capital indictments to include the
aggravators. 2 However, even if this argument is successful, it leaves unanswered
the question of whether or not the right to an indictment that alleges the aggrava-
tors can be invoked retroactively on appeal.
If a Virginia attomeydoes tryto applythe implications of Ring retroactively
in a habeas proceeding, Hanmm becomes relevant because it is a harbinger of
how the Fourth Circuit will rule.2" Whether or not Rirg will be a lied retroac-
tivelydepends on whetherRigmeets one of the two Tzge v Lai exceptions.
30
In Hamm?; however, the Fourth Circuit stated that even if Appenri and Jone
could be applied on collateral review, their application would be barred by statu-
tory habeas requirements." The Fourth Circuit then interpreted Wgrni v
T9/o92 to mean that "a federal habeas court may only consider the holdings of
the Supreme Court as they existed at the time of the state court ruling."" This is
a dubious reading of Wlian, which states that "whatever would qualifyas an old
rule under our Tengejurisprudence will constitute 'clearlyestablished Federal law,
as determined bythe Supreme Court of the United States' under 2254(d)(1)."1
4
The Fourth Crcuit seems to be interpreting this language to mean that new rules,
as defined under Tazgw, will not constitute clearly established federal law and
therefore cannot be applied in a federal habeas review. However, Wdian does
25. Jam, 526 US. at 243 n.6.
26. SeeVA. CODE ANN.S 19.2-217 (Mlchie2000) (stating that "no person shall be put on
trial for any felony, unless an indictment or presentment shall hve first been found or made by a
grand juryin a court of competent jurisdiction").
27. SeeJanice L Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 143 (2002) (analyzing Ring v. Arizona,
120 S. CL 2428 (2002)).
28. SeeHaw=nm, 283 F.3d at 195 n.4.
29. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
30. Teague v. Lane, 489 US. 288,311 (1989) (holding that there are two instances where new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure can be granted retroactive status- if the new rule places
pnrimy offense conduct beyond the power of the State to punish or if the new rule is a watershed
of criminal procedure); see Kopec, sqa note 27.
31. Hanmm, 283 F.3d at 195 n.4; swalws 2254 (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to any claim heard by a state court shall be denied "unless the adjudication of the claim--(1) resulted
in a decision that was contraryto, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States").
32. 529 US. 362 (2000).
33. Hanmm, 283 F.3d at 195 n.4 (sta that a federal habeas court can onlyrelyon Supreme
Court holdings as theyexisted at the time of the state court's ruling (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
US. 362, 412 (2000))). But see l'dlinm, 529 US. at 412 (stating that old rules under Twgr count
as clearly established Federal lau).
34. W'di mA, 529 US. at 412.
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not explain what will happen to new rules that have been excepted under the
Tiague analysis and do applyretroactively. s In short, attorneys should expect the
Fourth Ctucit to denythe retroactive application of Ringunder the Anti-Terror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA7) even if Ringis granted retroac-
tive status under Tezgu 36
Attorneys can employHom v Bars 37 to argue that a rule that is considered
retroactive under Tugw should not be barred by AEDPA.38 The United States
Supreme Court stated in Hrm
[I]f our post-AEDPA cases sugest ayhig about AEDPA's relation-
ship to Tazgw, it is that AEDPA-and TaWkgquines are distinct. Thus
in iddition to perfomug any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal
court considerng a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague
analysis .... "
The Court distinguished between the requirements of AEDPA and an analysis
under Tazgi and required that a Tegue analysis be conducted first.' The Court
in Horn did not allow a federal court to determine that a rule was permissible
under AEDPA and then simplyforgo a Tatgw analysis that might have precluded
the rule.41 In short, if AEDPA had permitted the use of a rule that was barred
under Tugue, Tazge would have been controlling. Bydeclaring that when Teague
is raised propedyit becomes a threshold issue, the Court is requiring the Tgue
analysis to be conducted first. This requirement could produce the opposite
effect of Hon- a rule could be permittedunder Tgue that might be considered
impermissible under AEDPA. Nevertheless, the same result should occur- the
Tazgmanalysis should be controlling. If the federal courts cannot relyon AEDPA
to ignore a rule's status as inapplicable under Taagi theycannot use AEDPA to
ignore its applicable status either. The Court stated that a Teague analysis is a
threshold issue, distinctive from anyanalysis required byAEDPA; thus if a Tagr
analysis results in a finding that RiVrdoes apply retroactively, the Fourth Circuit
should not be able to bar retroactive application through AEDPA.42
V. Cb ion
The Fourth Circuit indicated that it will not applyAppWm. andJon retroac-
tively, therefore, the court is not likely to apply Rirg retroactively either. Attor-
35. Id
36. Se28 US.C S 2254.
37. 122 S. 0. 2147 (2002).
38. Hornv. Banks, 122 S. O. 2147 (2002) (holding that Togeis a threshold issue in a federal
habeas proceeding); s 28 US.C S 2254; seralsoKopec, sr note 27; Janice L. Kopec, Case Note,
15 CAP. DEF.J. 133 (2002) (analyzing Horny. Banks, 122 S. Q. 2147 (2002)).
39. Hor, 122 S. Q. at 2151 (citations omitted).
40. id
41. Id at 2150.
42. Id at 2150-51.
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neys should expect the Fourth Circuit to bar retroactive application of Rinunder
AEDPA even if R4 is held to be retroactive under Tazgue. However, the United
States Supreme Court's language in Hommaybe able to defeat an exclusion under
AEDPA.
Janice L. Kopec
